Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and contributing writer at The Atlantic, warns that the United States is moving toward dictatorship under Donald Trump. Kagan argues this is not speculative: he began warning in late 2023 and sees subsequent developments as predictable steps toward consolidation of power. He points to actions in the first year of Trump’s second term that, in his view, resemble textbook tools of a dictator: dismantling parts of the federal bureaucracy, subordinating or co-opting the Justice Department, the FBI and the CIA, and creating aggressive enforcement operations—particularly an ICE unit—that function as a “brute squad.”
Central to Kagan’s concern is Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election outcome and his public advocacy for federal intervention in state-run elections. He has proposed federalizing elections in multiple states and placing partisan Republican overseers in charge—moves Kagan calls blatantly dictatorial and illegal. Trump’s rhetoric and plans to build a national voter file, seize ballots (as occurred in Fulton County, Georgia), and deploy federal forces to counties and districts he sees as politically hostile signal an intent to prevent opposition victories, especially in congressional midterms and future presidential contests.
Kagan believes Trump’s motives are both personal and political: he views Democratic control of Congress as an existential threat to his power, expecting impeachment and seeking to preemptably neutralize the opposition. Tactics Kagan highlights include voter intimidation (intending to deter nonwhite voters), selective seizure or discarding of ballots, and leveraging the power ministries to target opponents—actions that could effectively nullify voters’ choices and end constitutional democracy in practice.
The use of ICE operations—Kagan says—serves multiple purposes beyond immigration enforcement: creating public disturbances to justify invoking the Insurrection Act, frightening communities (particularly nonwhite communities) to suppress turnout, and demonstrating federal willingness to use force against domestic populations. He describes ICE’s actions in places like Minneapolis as a test run for broader seizure of power. He also emphasizes that much of this is intertwined with a strand of white Christian supremacy and ethnoreligious nationalism present in American history, now prominent in Republican politics and expressed openly by figures like Stephen Miller and JD Vance.
Kagan contextualizes the threat historically: antiliberal, ethnoreligious visions of America—those that reject the founders’ universalist ideals—have long existed alongside liberal traditions. The Constitution itself embodied compromises with slavery; post–Civil War struggles and 20th-century reforms produced a long period of liberal ascendancy. That ascendancy isn’t permanent, Kagan warns. The same forces that resisted equality at earlier points in history are active now, seeking to redefine American identity and governance.
On checks and balances, Kagan is pessimistic. He doubts courts—especially the Supreme Court—would reliably block national-security or emergency claims used to justify extraordinary measures. He notes historical precedent (e.g., Korematsu) where courts deferred to executive national-security assertions. He also expresses limited faith in Republican lawmakers to oppose Trump: only a few senators could stop extreme measures, and he sees little reason to expect sufficient Republican defections. That leaves ordinary Americans and institutions as primary bulwarks—though Kagan laments the collapse of elite resistance. Universities, major law firms, and corporate America have often accommodated Trump rather than resisting; Kagan finds this failure of courage and civic responsibility alarming.
Kagan catalogs personal traits of Trump that align with autocratic leaders: narcissism, megalomania, chronic lying, transactionalism, corruption, and unending appetite for power and glory. These traits shape policy: public pronouncements blend personal grievance with foreign and domestic strategy, as in Trump’s Davos speech where he tied NATO complaints to claims of a stolen election and an ideal of “strong borders, strong elections, [and] a fair media” that, in practice, reads as a preference for control over press and electoral institutions.
Internationally, Kagan argues Trump has effectively undermined NATO and traditional alliances without formally withdrawing. His insults, threats of territorial aggression (joking or not about Greenland and Canada), tariff wars, and encouragement of right-wing movements in Europe have alienated allies. Kagan warns that if the U.S. stops reliably providing security and upholding the norms of alliance politics, the post–World War II American order will unravel. The result would be a return to a multipolar world like the 19th century: multiple great powers rearming, seeking spheres of influence, and engaging in more frequent great-power conflicts—a far more dangerous, unstable, and costly international system.
Kagan stresses the strategic cost of losing alliances: American power has depended not only on material capabilities but on a global network of allies and strategic partners. If those partners distance themselves, rearm, or pursue independent agendas, the United States loses a critical advantage even if its own military and economy remain strong. He points to signs of allies looking elsewhere for trade and security partnerships as evidence that American credibility is eroding.
On domestic politics and resisting the drift toward dictatorship, Kagan suggests several fronts where action is necessary: public courage from citizens, decisive resistance by political leaders, and moral leadership from elites and institutions. He names the protests in Minneapolis and elsewhere as examples of civic bravery but calls such grassroots action a fragile foundation on which to rely. He criticizes Democratic leadership and institutional actors for not doing enough—saying that, in many cases, American institutions have acquiesced or capitulated rather than mobilizing to defend democratic norms.
Regarding whether America can return to its prior form, Kagan is skeptical. He points out the durability of damage done to federal institutions—especially the politicization of the FBI, CIA, and Justice Department—and the difficulty of reconstructing norms and nonpartisan professional civil service after deep politicization. Reversal is possible, he allows, but likely to be partial and painful; returning to the post–World War II order would require significant institutional repair and a reassertion of democratic culture that may be hard to achieve.
Kagan frames his stance as rooted in belief that liberal democratic principles—universal individual rights and protections against state overreach—are both morally right and require power to sustain. He rejects both utopianism and isolationist restraint as inadequate responses; instead he advocates for defending liberal order with effective power and alliances. He warns that failing to do so will bring both domestic autocracy and an international era of renewed great-power rivalry.
His bottom-line message: the consolidation of a dictatorship is not an abstract possibility but an urgent and growing reality unless Americans—citizens, institutions, and elites—recognize the danger and act decisively to defend democratic processes, norms, and alliances.