After Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called U.S. attacks on Iran a violation of international law, President Donald Trump said he told Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to “cut off all dealings with Spain” — an example of how this administration has signaled willingness to use the Treasury Department against foreign critics.
The Treasury Department, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), traditionally uses sanctions to block foreigners who pose serious threats: terrorists, drug traffickers, proliferators, and officials who commit human rights abuses or corruption. Blocked parties are added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which freezes assets in U.S. jurisdiction, bars Americans and U.S. firms from dealing with them, restricts access to U.S. financial services, and often includes travel restrictions.
Since Trump began his second term, former State Department and Treasury officials say the administration has applied — and in some cases removed — sanctions in ways that diverge from historical practice and the intent of sanction programs, sometimes appearing responsive to political loyalty or criticism of the president.
Targeting critics
In 2025 the Treasury repeatedly sanctioned prominent foreign officials who had criticized or acted against interests aligned with Trump. Examples include:
– International Criminal Court staff: After the ICC issued arrest warrants in 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a former defense minister over the Gaza war, OFAC began sanctioning some ICC judges and prosecutors in early 2025. By December, eleven ICC staffers had been sanctioned. Apart from two ICC staff sanctions in 2020 under Trump’s first term, no prior U.S. president had sanctioned ICC employees.
– Francesca Albanese: The U.N. special rapporteur investigating human rights in the Palestinian territories was sanctioned in July 2025 after she described Israeli actions as potentially amounting to genocide. Albanese later filed a lawsuit in February 2026 alleging constitutional and procedural violations by Trump, Bessent and others, saying the sanctions prevented access to property in the U.S. and violated her rights.
– Alexandre de Moraes: In July 2025, as Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court probed whether former President Jair Bolsonaro sought a coup, Treasury sanctioned the lead justice in a move Secretary Bessent justified as responding to censorship, arbitrary detentions and politicized prosecutions. The department later sanctioned the justice’s wife after the court convicted Bolsonaro in September; by December, sanctions on the Brazilian justice and his wife had been lifted.
– Gustavo Petro: In October 2025 OFAC sanctioned Colombia’s president, citing alleged involvement in the “international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.” The designation came a month after Petro publicly accused the U.S. of violating international law and called a U.S. attack on a Colombian fisherman “murder.” Petro rejected the Treasury’s allegations, saying Colombia had seized more cocaine under his government than any other.
Use of Global Magnitsky
Some high-profile sanctions were imposed under the Global Magnitsky program, designed to punish foreigners responsible for serious human rights abuses and corruption. The program was named after Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in custody after exposing corruption. Democratic senators criticized the application of Magnitsky designations in several cases, arguing there was insufficient evidence and that such actions undermined U.S. credibility.
Consequences and pushback
Sanctions can have severe practical and reputational consequences. Those designated report frozen assets in the U.S., loss of access to U.S. banking and markets, and reputational fallout that can limit dealings with third-country firms. The ICC responded to sanctions on its staff by calling them “a flagrant attack against the independence of an impartial judicial institution.” Petro called his sanction an “arbitrary act typical of an oppressive regime.”
Some sanctioned individuals have contested designations through OFAC’s petition and delisting mechanisms or in court. The Treasury allows petitions for removal and sometimes requires commitments (audited financials, divestitures, donations) to address underlying concerns. But several recent delistings raised questions among former diplomats and U.S. lawmakers about the criteria and consistency of removals.
Delistings and political ties
Critics point to multiple delistings that they say were not clearly tied to behavioral change:
– Antal Rogán: Sanctioned in January 2025 for involvement in political corruption in Hungary, Rogán’s designation was removed in April 2025. Former U.S. ambassador to Hungary David Pressman suggested the delisting may have been influenced by perceived personal loyalty between Trump and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, whom Trump publicly endorsed.
– Horacio Cartes: Paraguay’s former president, accused by Treasury in 2023 of corruption and links to Hezbollah intermediaries, had his sanctions removed in October 2025. Former U.S. ambassador Marc Ostfield said Cartes had not shown clear change warranting delisting.
– Milorad Dodik: Removed from the SDN list in October 2025 after being sanctioned for undermining Bosnian stability and for corruption and ties to Russia, Dodik later posted photos of a White House meeting in February 2026 with White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt. Senators and others questioned both the rationale for delisting and the White House meeting.
Officials and former officials weigh in
Former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew emphasized that past OFAC designations were based on “irreproachable” facts. Richard Nephew, a former State Department anti-corruption coordinator, called the recent pattern “political retribution rather than a serious use of sanctions tools for behavior modification purposes.” David Pressman warned the authority appears to be “rewarding loyalists and punishing those who are perceived to be opponents,” adding that sanctions should operate independent of personal interests and reinforce strategic U.S. policy.
Administration response
The Treasury declined comment through spokesperson Gigi O’Connell on specific recent sanction choices and delistings. The White House did not respond to a request explaining some delistings or meetings with previously sanctioned figures.
The debate
The recent use and reversal of sanctions has sparked debate about whether OFAC’s tools are being employed in service of U.S. national security and human rights goals or used selectively for political ends. Lawmakers, former diplomats, and human rights institutions have raised concerns that inconsistent application and apparent politicization undermine the credibility and intended purpose of sanctions as instruments to protect Americans and change abusive behavior abroad.
NPR requested information from people with knowledge of recent delistings; reporters can be contacted via the methods listed in the original report.