The National Transportation Safety Board has flagged staffing procedures as a concern in its probe of the LaGuardia Airport accident that killed two Air Canada pilots Sunday night.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said two air traffic controllers were in the tower when the Air Canada Express jet collided with a Port Authority fire truck. At least one controller was performing multiple duties, she said, but she cautioned against blaming individual controllers and stressed the issue appears systemic: “This is a heavy workload environment.”
Homendy noted it is often standard on the midnight shift for only two controllers to cover duties normally handled by more people. Given LaGuardia’s dense air traffic, she questioned whether that practice makes sense there and said the NTSB will examine it. A local controller—responsible for active runways and immediate airspace—and a controller in charge—overseeing overall safety—were on duty. The controller in charge also was acting as clearance delivery, which issues departure clearances. The NTSB has conflicting information about whether one of the controllers was also serving as ground controller, who manages vehicle movements on taxiways.
Homendy said the NTSB’s air traffic control team has raised concerns about the midnight shift and staffing for years. While the agency has no indication fatigue was a factor in this crash, the midnight shift has been a recurring focus in past investigations. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said Monday that LaGuardia’s staffing is relatively good; the airport wants 37 controllers, Duffy said, and there were 33 on staff with seven more in training.
Investigators recovered the cockpit voice recorder and sent it to the NTSB lab for analysis. NTSB investigator Doug Brazy summarized the last three minutes of audio: the flight crew completed the landing checklist and alerts indicated the aircraft was nearing the runway. An unknown airport vehicle transmitted to the tower but its call was “stepped on”—interrupted—by another transmission. Firefighters told the tower they wanted to cross the runway while responding to reports of fumes from a United Airlines plane; controllers granted the request.
According to the recording, controllers told the truck to stop nine seconds before the recording ended. The fire truck did not have a transponder, Homendy said. The tower could use an Airport Surface Detection System, Model X (ASDE‑X), to track surface movement, but it did not produce an alert in this case. The NTSB tech center’s preliminary analysis says ASDE‑X failed to generate an alert because vehicles were merging and unmerging near the runway, preventing it from creating a high‑confidence track.
In the final seconds captured, it sounds like the aircraft touched down eight seconds before the recording ends; six seconds out the first officer transferred control to the captain; four seconds out tower controllers again told the firefighters to stop.
Homendy emphasized that findings are preliminary and subject to verification. Investigators still do not know who made the transmission that was stepped on, why a controller remained on duty after the crash, whether the firefighters heard the stop commands, whether the pilots saw the truck, or whether there was confusion in the cockpit. “We rarely, if ever, investigate a major accident where it was one failure,” Homendy said, noting aviation safety relies on multiple layers of defense and that many things likely went wrong.
