The first signs an American aircraft had been shot down surfaced on Telegram: photos of wreckage and an empty ejection seat, followed by videos of search-and-rescue aircraft over southwestern Iran. Jake Godin, a senior researcher at Bellingcat, and an informal network of journalists, activists and online investigators moved to verify the posts — and quickly ran into new obstacles.
Iran has imposed a strict internet blackout inside its borders, limiting what civilians can send out. At the same time, commercial satellite imagery that investigators rely on has been curtailed. Planet, a major provider, first put a two-week delay on images and then stopped sharing recent imagery of the Middle East altogether; Vantor also limited distribution. Planet said in an email that the U.S. government had requested an indefinite withhold of imagery in a designated area of interest and that it expected the policy to last through the conflict. The company later described its decisions as voluntary and said it hoped to restore access while limiting the risk of misuse.
The pullback has been consequential because Planet and Vantor supply high-resolution, frequently updated photos used to corroborate ground videos and photos. Observers used Planet imagery early in the war to document damage and link disparate videos to locations. For example, Planet images were cited by CNN and the New York Times to show damage at bases and communications infrastructure after strikes; outlets also used satellite photos to show a strike on an Iranian school was part of a larger set of military targets, prompting the U.S. to acknowledge responsibility and open an investigation.
The restrictions reflect a broader effort by states to control the flow of wartime imagery. Experts note this is not new: governments long sought to shield the public from the full horrors of war, and in the 20th century were often successful in tightly censoring visuals. By the Vietnam era, televised reporting made that control harder, and later strategies included embedding reporters with troops to shape coverage. Today’s blend of social media and commercial satellites gave the public and investigators more ways to verify and chronicle conflicts — from the Arab Spring to Syria and, more recently, the torrent of photos and videos from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
But the Iran conflict has been different. Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group says the near-complete internet blackout inside Iran is more severe than recent incidents; widespread citizen reporting that occurred during previous strikes didn’t repeat this time. Across the Gulf, authorities have arrested or detained hundreds for posting videos of strikes or military sites. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior said it arrested more than 300 people for filming and spreading “misleading” information; Abu Dhabi police reported arresting 375 people for taking unauthorized photos and spreading false information. Israel has also restricted what citizens and journalists can post online.
These measures are partly about security and partly about economics: Gulf states worry that images of conflict will damage their reputations as safe places to live and invest, a concern especially acute in Dubai. Jim Krane of Rice University links some censorship directly to preserving the “safe haven” image that underpins regional business models.
The U.S. has also taken steps that limit independent reporting. Relations between the Pentagon and many journalists were strained after the defense secretary demanded press pledges restricting reporting practices. With reduced access to the Pentagon and troops, reporters leaned heavily on satellite imagery — which then drew pressure from military and government officials concerned about operational security and the exposure of sensitive sites.
Commercial satellite providers are regulated and rely heavily on government contracts: Planet reported nearly 60% of its recent revenue came from defense and intelligence customers. Vantor likewise is a major government contractor. That financial and regulatory environment likely influenced the companies’ decisions to restrict imagery.
The effect on verification has been real. Experts warn that without recent high-resolution satellite imagery, it becomes harder to fact-check videos, especially in an era of convincing AI-generated content. Jeffrey Lewis of Middlebury College described satellite imagery as a critical “pin” that lets analysts tie multiple videos to a single place; without it, sorting fact from fiction is more difficult.
Despite the constraints, information has not dried up completely. Pro-government Telegram channels in Iran still publish videos, and images have slipped out of Gulf countries — including widely shared photos of a destroyed U.S. E-3 Sentry aircraft at a Saudi base. Publicly funded satellites, like NASA’s Terra and Landsat systems, continue to supply lower-resolution imagery, and some commercial providers such as Airbus have continued to release a trickle of images.
Open-source investigators and journalists are adapting. Bellingcat released a tool using older radar data to assess damage across the region, showing how analysts are turning to alternative data sources and methods. Godin and others say they’ve become used to shifting information environments and are adept at finding workarounds; they acknowledge censorship has made verification harder but not impossible.
In short, efforts by states and some companies to impose a digital “fog of war” around Iran have complicated the work of independent verification and reporting. They have limited the flow of high-resolution satellite imagery and tightened controls on social media inside and near the conflict, but they have not fully closed off evidence. Public satellites, allied commercial providers, social platforms and inventive analysts continue to provide fragments of the picture, and the community of open-source investigators is resourceful in piecing them together.