NPR’s Adrian Ma talks with Beirut-based journalist Kim Ghattas about how the widening confrontation between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other is reshaping politics across the region.
Ghattas describes severe disruption in Lebanon after an Israeli evacuation order covered large parts of Beirut’s southern suburbs. Those neighborhoods are densely populated parts of the city’s greater urban area; roughly 800,000 people—about 13% of Lebanon’s population—were displaced. The mass evacuation created widespread panic and intense social and economic pressure nationwide.
She warns Lebanon has entered a perilous new phase, with the threat of a deeper Israeli ground offensive in the south, where much of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and offices are concentrated. Many fear residents may not be able to return to the southern suburbs if military operations continue. Hezbollah’s decision to fire rockets at Israel in apparent solidarity with Iran has further escalated hostilities and fueled anger inside Lebanon, especially among non-Shia communities.
Ghattas stresses that Hezbollah is not the Lebanese state. Lebanon’s government has publicly declared Hezbollah’s military actions illegal, demanded Iranian Revolutionary Guard units withdraw, and arrested people found carrying weapons in the south. Yet many Lebanese see those steps as too little, too late. Officials had long avoided confronting Hezbollah more forcefully to prevent internal clashes; that restraint has now left the country caught up in a broader war with Israel.
Asked whether this could trigger a civil war, Ghattas says she does not believe a full-scale civil war is imminent. Resentment toward Hezbollah runs deep and isolated violent incidents are possible, but the same fears of civil strife that kept the state from confronting Hezbollah previously remain a central consideration. Still, Lebanon now faces the strain of sustained, intense conflict for a second time in roughly 18 months.
On the wider region, Ghattas notes Iran’s use of missiles and drones into neighboring states—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Oman—has been intended to raise the political and economic costs of the confrontation. Although Tehran frames many strikes as aimed at U.S. military targets, civilian infrastructure has also been hit. The strategy appears designed to pressure Gulf governments and others to urge the U.S. to de-escalate, lest the region suffer prolonged economic and security damage: spiking oil prices, disrupted trade routes, harm to energy production, and declines in tourism.
That approach carries risks. Ghattas says Gulf states that had recently moved toward détente with Tehran are now rallying together in response to the violence. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite earlier disagreements, have shown unity in the face of the escalation. While Gulf governments have so far avoided overt military commitments—keeping their airspace and territories largely off-limits for operations—they are increasingly aligned against Iran and could press the U.S. to manage the crisis diplomatically.
Ghattas doubts Gulf states will enter the conflict militarily at this point; their priority appears to be protecting economic and security interests while steering clear of direct combat. Paradoxically, Iran’s attempt to make neighboring countries share the conflict’s burdens could consolidate regional opposition to Tehran instead of breaking Gulf resistance.
She closes by observing that the current war may have long-term consequences for alliances and political balances across the Middle East, reshaping alignments well beyond the immediate fighting.