The US–Israeli campaign against Iran that began on February 28, 2026, is likely to end with an American retreat. The United States cannot sustain this conflict without inflicting catastrophic damage on the region’s oil, gas, and desalination infrastructure, producing long-lasting global fallout. Iran can impose costs the United States cannot afford — and the world should not be forced to bear.
The operation carried out by Washington and Jerusalem was presented as a decapitation strike. Israeli leaders, backed by the Mossad director, sold President Donald Trump on a plan of intense joint bombing intended to break Iran’s command systems, cripple its nuclear program, and eliminate senior IRGC leadership so the regime would disintegrate and a more pliant government could be installed.
That scenario rested on a false analogy with Venezuela. The US-enabled operation in Caracas in January 2026 removed Nicolás Maduro and installed a more cooperative administration with much of the existing power structure left intact. Trump appears to have assumed Iran would follow the same script. It did not. Iran is not Venezuela — historically, culturally, geographically, demographically, or militarily.
Rather than collapsing, Iran’s regime held together. The IRGC, far from being shattered, emerged more centralized and more central to national security. The office of the supreme leader remained intact, the clerical establishment closed ranks, and the public rallied against external attack. Two months on, there is no successor government in Tehran, no Iranian surrender, and no credible military path to the victory the US and Israel sought.
Several factors explain these miscalculations.
First, American leaders fundamentally underestimated Iran’s resilience. Iran is a civilization with millennia of history and a deep reservoir of national pride. Iranians remember foreign intervention, including the 1953 overthrow of a democratic government, and are unlikely to yield to coercion or bombing.
Second, US decision-makers underappreciated Iran’s technological and industrial capabilities. Decades of sanctions have not prevented Iran from building a native defense-industrial base: advanced ballistic missiles, an indigenous drone sector, and even orbital-launch capacity. That homegrown expertise matters strategically.
Third, the economics of modern warfare favor Iran’s approach. Iranian ballistic missiles and drones are orders of magnitude cheaper than the interceptors and platforms the US relies on to shoot them down. Small, inexpensive drones and relatively low-cost antiship and antiair missiles can threaten very expensive ships and defensive systems. Iran’s layered air defenses, anti-access/area-denial posture in the Gulf, and capacity to saturate defenses raise the operational price of coercion far above what the United States can sustain — especially when accounting for Iran’s ability to inflict damage on neighboring states and global energy routes.
Fourth, US policy-making around the campaign was deeply flawed. The decision to go to war was driven by a narrow circle of presidential loyalists outside normal interagency deliberations, at a time when the National Security Council and other advising bodies had been weakened. Senior officials resigned in protest, describing an echo chamber that distorted assessments and hid dissenting views. The result was a war of whim, not of necessity.
This was not a rational bid to defend clear, achievable interests; it was an attempt to preserve a global dominance the United States no longer fully wields and to secure a regional dominance for Israel that is unrealistic.
The most likely endgame is a return to something resembling the prewar status quo, but with three consequential changes: Iran will exercise effective control over the Strait of Hormuz; its deterrent posture will be substantially enhanced; and the US long-term military footprint in the Gulf will be reduced. Iran’s nuclear program, proxy networks, and missile arsenal are likely to remain largely as they were before the war.
Even after a retreat, Iran is unlikely to press its advantage aggressively. Tehran has strategic incentives for cooperation with Gulf neighbors, little interest in renewing a conflict it has already weathered, and external restraints from its major patrons, Russia and China, both of which prefer a stable, functioning region.
Expect the White House to try to spin a retreat as a victory. The reality is different: US leaders misread Iran’s sophistication, shut down essential deliberative processes, and underestimated how shifts in military technology favor low-cost asymmetric tools. The United States cannot achieve its aims against Iran without incurring unacceptable financial, military, and political costs.
What is recoverable, however, is policy sanity. The US should end attempts at regime change, step back from coercive fantasies, and return to international law and diplomacy as the path to resolving its disputes with Tehran.
The views expressed here are the author’s own.