When the EU agreed on April 23 to unlock a €90bn loan to Ukraine, many in Kyiv and across Europe felt a bitter trade-off had been struck: the package was tied to repairs on the Druzhba pipeline, a conduit that carries Russian crude across Hungarian territory to refineries in Hungary and Slovakia. Budapest lifted its veto on the aid after Kyiv arranged for the pipeline to be fixed.
Landlocked Hungary and Slovakia say Druzhba is their sole source of crude. Last year about 9.25 million tonnes flowed through the line to those countries, a volume with an export value in excess of $4bn. Ukrainian officials argue that even that reduced revenue for Moscow directly funds weapons and casualties on the battlefield; one Ukrainian lawmaker on the energy committee called the deal both morally troubling and strategically unfair, saying Kyiv was being asked to restore a route that benefits the aggressor in order to secure vital support.
Brussels banned seaborne imports of Russian crude and refined products in 2023 but left a temporary carve-out for pipeline deliveries. While Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland have diversified away from Druzhba by using alternative pipelines and new terminals, the pipeline has remained indispensable for much of Central Europe. Energy consultants note that losing Druzhba is manageable for many Western states but poses a much harder challenge for Hungary and Slovakia.
Hungary could potentially receive oil through the Adria pipeline from Croatia, but a legal dispute between the two countries complicates that option. Shutting refineries and shifting to imports of refined products would be expensive and would disrupt industries that rely on crude-derived feedstocks such as naphtha for fertilizer, asphalt and plastics, energy experts warn.
Flows stopped earlier in 2026 after Kyiv said a pumping station was hit in a Russian air raid on Jan. 27 and deemed too dangerous for repair crews. Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico questioned Kyiv’s account; Orbán formally pressed the European Commission in early March to insist Ukraine allow oil to transit. European inspection teams that went to Kyiv were not allowed access to the damaged site, and Budapest used the stoppage to reverse its prior support for the loan, setting up a high-stakes standoff.
Ukraine appears to have timed repairs after Orbán lost his parliamentary majority in an April 12 election, and flow through the pipeline resumed on April 23. Ukrainian officials say they will do whatever they can to prevent further killing, and some in Kyiv view the episode as a demonstration of how energy infrastructure can be wielded for political leverage.
Relations between Kyiv and Budapest have been strained for years. Kyiv accuses Hungary of pressuring it over minority language and education policies since 2016 and of repeatedly blocking steps in Ukraine’s EU accession process. In June 2025 Hungary formally blocked the start of accession talks and held a referendum where an official 95 percent voted against membership, a result critics described as engineered. The European Parliament has publicly criticized democratic backsliding in Hungary, curtailed some of its EU responsibilities, and many member states were sceptical of Budapest’s 2024 EU presidency and Viktor Orbán’s outreach to Moscow and Beijing.
Slovakia under Robert Fico has also taken a more Russia-friendly course at times. Fico met Vladimir Putin in December 2023, attended Russia’s May 9 Victory Day events in 2024, and voiced support for neutrality and closer ties with Moscow. He later vetoed Ukrainian accession talks in mid-2025 and blocked an 18th package of sanctions against Russia, though he and Ukraine’s president appeared to make a symbolic reconciliation during a meeting in Uzhgorod in September.
Many in Kyiv and elsewhere in the EU view Hungary’s and Slovakia’s positions as effectively aligning with Moscow by exploiting Central Europe’s dependence on Russian crude. Some analysts sympathize with Ukraine’s reluctance to repair infrastructure that serves Russia while European states try to cajole Budapest and Bratislava into supporting Kyiv.
After shifting from withholding repairs on its own territory, Kyiv moved to disrupt Russian-fed elements of the Druzhba system inside Russia. Ukraine’s Security Service claimed responsibility for a Feb. 23 blaze at the Kaleykino pumping station in Tatarstan, and later for an April 21 strike on the Transneft-Privolga pumping facility in Samara that damaged large crude storage tanks. These actions have had a broader impact: outside analysts have estimated the strikes curtailed roughly 40 percent of Russia’s pipeline export capacity and contributed to a reduction of about half a million barrels per day in output compared with late 2025, with consequences for regional and global markets.
The diplomatic and political fallout is ongoing. Hungary’s incoming prime minister has said he will hold another referendum on Ukraine’s accession, and EU capitals are divided on how to respond. Observers warn that accession negotiations will become more fraught and force difficult choices among key member states about how to balance enlargement, energy security and relations with Moscow.