An exchange between President Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent — in which Trump said he told Bessent to ‘cut off all dealings with Spain’ after Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez criticized U.S. attacks on Iran — illustrates a broader shift in how the administration has used the Treasury Department against foreign officials and institutions.
Under long-standing practice, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) deploys sanctions to block foreign actors who pose clear threats: terrorists, drug traffickers, weapons proliferators, and foreign officials accused of human rights abuses or corruption. Those designated are added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which freezes any assets under U.S. jurisdiction, bars Americans and U.S. companies from dealings with them, limits access to U.S. financial services and frequently brings travel restrictions.
Since the start of Trump’s second term, former State and Treasury officials say the administration has both imposed and lifted sanctions in ways that depart from historical norms and the stated intent of sanction programs — at times appearing responsive to political loyalty or criticism of the president.
High-profile targets and timing
Several high-profile designations in 2025 drew attention because the targets had criticized policies or actions aligned with the administration or had been involved in politically sensitive matters:
– International Criminal Court staff: After the ICC issued arrest warrants in 2024 for Israel’s prime minister and a former defense minister over the Gaza war, OFAC began sanctioning some ICC judges and prosecutors in early 2025. By December 2025, eleven ICC staffers had been sanctioned. Apart from two ICC staff sanctions in 2020 during Trump’s first term, no previous U.S. president had sanctioned ICC employees.
– Francesca Albanese: The U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories was sanctioned in July 2025 after describing Israeli actions as potentially amounting to genocide. Albanese later sued in February 2026, alleging constitutional and procedural violations by Trump, Bessent and others and saying the sanctions blocked access to property in the United States and violated her rights.
– Alexandre de Moraes: In July 2025, as Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court examined whether former President Jair Bolsonaro had sought a coup, Treasury designated the lead justice, with Secretary Bessent framing the action as a response to censorship, arbitrary detentions and politicized prosecutions. The department later sanctioned the justice’s wife after Brazil convicted Bolsonaro in September; by December both sanctions had been revoked.
– Gustavo Petro: In October 2025 OFAC designated Colombia’s president on allegations of involvement in the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production. The move came a month after Petro publicly accused the U.S. of violating international law and criticized a U.S. strike that killed a Colombian fisherman. Petro rejected the allegations and pointed to Colombian drug seizures during his administration.
Use of Global Magnitsky and objections
Some of the recent measures were taken under the Global Magnitsky program, which is intended to target individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses and corruption. Named after Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, the program has been criticized by some Democratic senators in these cases for allegedly lacking sufficient evidence, prompting concerns that misapplication undermines U.S. credibility.
Practical effects and institutional pushback
Sanctions carry concrete financial and reputational costs: frozen assets in the U.S., loss of access to U.S. banking and markets, and a stigma that can limit third-country business relationships. The ICC called sanctions on its staff ‘a flagrant attack against the independence of an impartial judicial institution.’ President Petro described his designation as an arbitrary, authoritarian act.
Those designated can seek administrative petitions to OFAC for delisting or challenge designations in court. OFAC sometimes conditions removal on remedial steps such as audited financial disclosures, divestitures or other commitments. But a series of recent delistings has spurred questions about the criteria for removal and whether political considerations have influenced decisions.
Delistings and perceived political ties
Critics highlight several delistings they say were not clearly linked to demonstrable behavioral changes by the individuals involved:
– Antal Rogán: Sanctioned in January 2025 for alleged involvement in political corruption in Hungary, Rogán was removed from the SDN list in April 2025. Former U.S. ambassador to Hungary David Pressman suggested the delisting may have been influenced by perceived personal loyalty between Trump and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, whom Trump publicly endorsed.
– Horacio Cartes: Paraguay’s former president, accused by Treasury in 2023 of corruption and alleged links to Hezbollah intermediaries, had his sanctions lifted in October 2025. Former U.S. ambassador Marc Ostfield said Cartes had not shown clear change warranting delisting.
– Milorad Dodik: Removed from the SDN list in October 2025 after earlier designations for undermining Bosnian stability, corruption and ties to Russia, Dodik later posted photos of a White House meeting in February 2026 with White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt. That meeting and the timing of the delisting prompted questions from senators and other observers about motivations.
Voices from current and former officials
Former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew stressed that past OFAC designations were grounded in ‘irreproachable’ facts. Richard Nephew, a former State Department anti-corruption coordinator, characterized the recent pattern as ‘political retribution rather than a serious use of sanctions tools for behavior modification purposes.’ David Pressman warned the authority appears to be ‘rewarding loyalists and punishing those who are perceived to be opponents,’ and said sanctions should remain independent of personal interests and aligned with strategic U.S. policy.
Administration response and wider debate
The Treasury declined to comment on specific recent sanction choices and delistings through spokesperson Gigi O’Connell. The White House did not provide explanations for certain delistings or meetings with previously sanctioned figures.
The recent use and reversal of sanctions has sparked a broader debate over whether OFAC’s powers continue to serve U.S. national security and human rights objectives or are being applied selectively for political ends. Lawmakers, former diplomats and human rights groups warn that inconsistent application and perceived politicization risk undermining the credibility of sanctions as tools to protect Americans and deter or change abusive behavior abroad.