A key tool of the U.S. intelligence community, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), will expire this month unless Congress renews it. The government says intelligence derived from Section 702 underpins a majority of items in the president’s daily intelligence brief and is essential for counterterrorism, counterespionage, cybersecurity, and combating transnational trafficking. Critics from both parties say the program allows warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications, violating privacy and the Fourth Amendment.
What Section 702 authorizes
Section 702 permits U.S. intelligence agencies to collect and review electronic communications of foreign nationals located outside the United States without obtaining individual court orders. Because foreign targets sometimes communicate with people inside the U.S., Americans’ communications can be incidentally collected.
A special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), issues a yearly, program-wide authorization that defines target categories proposed by the attorney general and the director of national intelligence. Agencies such as the NSA, CIA, FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center obtain data directly from U.S. companies that carry email, social media and phone services. The NSA also collects communications that traverse the internet backbone with compelled assistance from network operators.
Why Congress is debating renewal now
Section 702’s authorization is time-limited and must be renewed by Congress; the current authority is set to lapse on April 20. Renewal fights have recurred for years. The issue does not break cleanly along party lines: some Republicans and Democrats favor reforms to limit warrantless access to Americans’ data, while others argue changes would hamper intelligence operations.
Prominent critics include Sen. Mike Lee (R‑Utah), Sen. Ron Wyden (D‑Ore.), and Rep. Warren Davidson (R‑Ohio). Some lawmakers who previously opposed the statute have shifted positions since the last renewal battle. President Trump has called for a clean 18‑month extension, a notable change from earlier public criticism of the program.
How large and central the program is
The volume of data collected under 702 is large and growing. Reported surveillance targets numbered roughly 349,823 in 2025, up from about 246,000 in 2022; each target can generate many records. The intelligence community says Section 702 contributed to 60% of items in the president’s daily brief in 2023 and played a major role in disrupting illicit synthetic drug operations and other counter-threat activities.
Searching Americans’ information in Section 702 data
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies can query the 702‑collected data for information about U.S. persons under rules that have been tightened over time. Agencies describe legitimate reasons for such queries, including locating a U.S. hostage by searching communications among a foreign terrorist network, identifying the scope of a cyber-attack on a U.S. victim, detecting foreign espionage targeting a government employee, or identifying threats to an official traveling abroad.
But the government does not now require a targeted court order—i.e., a warrant—to perform these “U.S. person queries.” Intelligence community and FBI officials have argued that a warrant requirement would be impractical and slow, undermining the ability to respond to fast-moving threats.
Civil liberties concerns and documented abuses
Privacy advocates contend that Section 702 permits routine, warrantless searches of Americans’ communications and that agencies conduct large numbers of so-called backdoor searches. Critics argue this erodes Fourth Amendment protections and lacks sufficient judicial oversight.
The FISC itself has criticized the FBI’s handling of 702 material. In a 2022 decision recertifying the program, the court characterized FBI violations as “persistent and widespread.” Transparency reports and oversight documents have documented improper searches and uses of 702 data, including queries involving a U.S. senator, journalists and commentators, thousands of Social Security numbers, tens of thousands of political donors, and an instance involving an FBI employee’s family member. Those instances have prompted calls from reformers for stricter limits and more accountability.
Current guardrails and enforcement
Federal law and agency rules impose restrictions on queries. FBI personnel must receive annual FISA training, and many searches for U.S. person data require supervisory or legal approval. Stricter approvals are required for queries involving political or media figures. Information obtained via 702 generally cannot be used to open ordinary criminal investigations without additional court authorization, except in cases involving national security crimes, death, kidnapping, serious bodily injury, or a few other specified serious offenses.
Agency disclosures show a marked decline in the number of reported U.S. person queries in recent years—from about 119,383 queries in the Dec. 2021–Nov. 2022 period to roughly 7,413 in the comparable 2024–2025 window—reflecting policy changes and enforcement efforts aimed at limiting improper searches.
The stakes and the fight ahead
Supporters of Section 702 say it is indispensable to protecting the homeland and U.S. interests abroad, crediting the program with disrupting plots, identifying cyber threats and tracking illicit drug supply chains. Opponents and civil liberties defenders contend that, without stronger judicial oversight and a warrant requirement for queries of Americans’ information, the program permits invasive and sometimes improper surveillance.
As authorization nears expiration, Congress faces a choice between renewing the statute as written, extending it with reforms to increase protections and oversight, or allowing it to lapse—each path likely to provoke a contentious debate over balancing national security needs and privacy rights.